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And now the telling of…

The Value of Truth and Its Pursuit
Caroline Rubach
Assigned in COM 587 (Rhetorical Theory): Professor Justin Kirk
Introduction
Upon first attempt, defining the
concept of truth may appear to be a fairly
manageable task. As one begins to gather
words to form a more encompassing, accurate
categorization, however, words begin to fail as
the concept seems to stretch wider and deeper
than it first appeared. In this process, truth
proves to be more than just facts or the
accumulation of wisdom and knowledge.
Instead, it lends itself to be a complex concept
that requires grappling and wrestling with, and
not always on unified terms.
Within the dynamic concept of truth,
there exists a tension between the underlying
assumptions through which truth can be
understood. Depending on one’s perception of
what truth is, it can be assumed to imply
relative and multiple truths, signaled by the use
of lower‑case “t” truth, or universal truth,
signaled by the use of capital “T” Truth.
Whether discussing truth with a lens of
universal Truth or relative truth, discussing the
topic is like cutting into an onion: initially, we
believe we are working with one thing in itself;
but with the first slice, we realize all the layers
involved and the questions that continue to
emerge as we approach the center. Perhaps
the most important question one will face is
whether the search for truth is even valuable at
all. The way that humans go about answering
this is through language.
Language is one of the strongest tools
humans possess for dissecting this question and
for co‑creating ideas that get closer to answers.

Regardless of the specific ideas and potential
answers that are created through discussions
and dialogues, the question remains, and
philosophers continue in their work. As C.S.
Lewis writes, “Do what they will, then, we
remain conscious of a desire which no natural
happiness will satisfy” (Weight of Glory, 1949, p.
4). This desire for something more is why
humans continue to ask questions and why the
discussion surrounding truth and its curious
nature perseveres, especially considering that
on its deepest level, this question is rooted in
the purpose of human existence. Accordingly,
the value of truth and of seeking it out is an
important rhetorical question to be
investigated.
Many philosophers have conducted
thorough investigations and have declared their
theories on what the value of truth is. However,
with no consensus reached, every woman and
man must choose for themselves whether to
believe in the value of truth and in searching for
it. One’s answer to this question will heavily
influence the way that they live and the values
they live with. Philosophers like Nietzsche think
that truth, being lower‑case “t” truth, exists but
is not inherently valuable. In what follows, I
argue that, as the works of C.S. Lewis and
others support, objective and universal Truth
exists, is inherently valuable, and is worth
seeking out. First, I analyze the contrasting
theories of Nietzsche and of Plato regarding the
definition of truth and its value, or lack thereof.
Next I examine multiple texts by C.S. Lewis to
present his theory of truth and its value,
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exhibiting similarities to Platonic theory and
acting as a counter‑example to Nietzschean
theory. Finally, I offer implications of Lewis’
work to the field of rhetoric.
Theory
Nietzsche
To understand Nietzsche’s theory of
truth, one must understand the context that
shaped his understanding on the matter.
Nietzsche, a German philosopher and scholar in
the latter half of the 19th century, was highly
influenced by the writings of Arthur
Schopenhauer, an early 19th century German
philosopher with a pessimistic worldview. One
of Schopenhauer’s central works is called The
World as Will and Representation, which
focuses on the will of man as being the
fundamental nature of human beings. Although
Nietzsche increasingly gained intellectual
independence from Schopenhauer as his career
progressed, Grace Neal Dolson from Duke
University notes that, “the notion of the primal
nature of the will [remains] the connecting link
between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer” (p. 244).
This attention on the omnipresence of the “will
to power” in the life of mankind is a key focal
point in Nietzsche’s later works; the will to
power “appears not only as the formula for all
existence, but as the criterion of value as well”
(p. 244).
Nietzsche unpacks the values
underlying modern‑day civilization. He sees
individuality and the will for power as a reality
of human existence and he views human beings
and their claims to knowledge as illegitimate
and dishonest. In his work entitled On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, Nietzsche implies that
humans fabricate what they know when he calls
humans “clever beasts who invented knowing”
(p. 79). Furthering this highly pessimistic view of
human nature, he writes, “One might invent
such a fable and yet he still would not have
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adequately illustrated how miserable, how
shadowy and transient, how aimless and
arbitrary the human intellect looks
within nature” (p. 79). This is the proper context
for understanding Nietzsche’s pessimistic
approach to truth and its value.
Furthermore, a passage from the same
text provides significant insight into the way
that Nietzsche views humans in their relation to
truth and their search for it:
Deception, flattering, lying… putting up a
false front, living in borrowed splendor,
wearing a mask… in short, a continuous
fluttering around the solitary flame of vanity
is so much the rule and the law among men
that there is almost nothing which is less
comprehensible than how an honest and
pure drive for truth could have arisen among
them. They are deeply immersed in illusions
and in dream images; their eyes merely glide
over the surface of things and see ‘forms.’
Their senses nowhere lead to truth; on the
contrary, they are content to receive stimuli
and, as it were, to engage in a groping game
on the backs of things. (p. 80)
Nietzsche believes that humans’ drive for truth
stems from a social contract that we have with
one another. He argues that, “from boredom
and necessity, man wished to exist socially and
with the herd” (p. 81). According to Nietzsche,
this contract is the first step for humanity
towards acquiring a drive for truth, defining
truth as a “uniformly valid and binding
designation… invented for things, and this
legislation of language likewise establishes the
first laws of truth” (p. 81). Conversely, he
defines lying as the act of making something
that is not real appear to be real (p. 81).
Nietzsche argues that humans do not
care much for truth at all, but rather only care
for it so much as they want to avoid the
negative and painful consequences of
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deception, or even to enjoy the positive
consequences of it, rather than wanting truth
for truth itself (p. 81). This theory implies that
enjoying something for its consequences is
looked down upon and is not a pure enough
intention. Overall, Nietzsche reiterates that
truth is a manmade concept, and that “truths
are illusions which we have forgotten…
illusions… metaphors… drained of [their]
sensuous force” (p. 84).
Clearly, Nietzsche’s view of humans in
relation to truth paints a pitiful picture. It
assumes that humans have fabricated
knowledge and they do not care to know truth.
As for the nature of truth itself, Nietzsche
believes that it, along with the world in general,
is highly subjective and lies completely in
interpretations. In other words, he believes in
lower‑case “t” truths, or relative truths,
depending on the perspective that one is
coming from and the interpretation one assigns.
In his eyes, there is no one objective and
universal truth, but there is “at most, an
aesthetic relation [between subject and
object]” (p. 86).
In his work The Will to Power (1968),
Nietzsche’s fascination of the opposing
viewpoint shows in his contrasting aversion to
adopting any one view of the world as objective
and universally true (p. 262). According to
Nietzsche’s theory regarding meaning in the
world, it is our needs that interpret the world.
He argues that “every drive is a lust to rule;
each one has a perspective that it would like to
compel all other drives to accept as a norm” (p.
267). According to Nietzsche, one can assign
meaning through interpretation; but just as
there are countless interpretations,
there will be countless meanings, deeming
these meanings only as products of our
imposing will and nothing more. Nietzsche
argues that there is no one true essence of
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something, because essence can vary
depending on the situation.
Overall, Nietzsche believes in a highly
subjective world where humans cannot truly
have knowledge, and where truth is
“constructed of fictitious entities” (p. 306).
Through this lens, there is no inherent value of
truth because “the value of the world lies in our
interpretations” (p. 330). However, Nietzsche
can see the value in the belief of truth, in that it
allows “appearance [to be] an arranged and
simplified world, at which our practical instincts
have been at work” (p. 306). Additionally, he
writes, “one may certainly admire man as a
mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in
piling up an infinitely complicated dome of
concepts,” albeit upon an “unstable
foundation… on running water” (On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, p. 85). Humanity’s
belief in knowledge and truth allows for people
to create a symbolic world in which they can
live. Nietzsche recognizes that this has value,
even if the knowledge and truth of the world
humans believe does not actually have value in
itself due to its highly subjective nature.
Nietzsche’s theory of truth represents
only one understanding of truth, a highly critical
and extremely pessimistic view. However, there
exists an opposing theory of truth that proposes
not only that objective and universal truth
exists, in contrast to Nietzsche’s view, but also
that truth is inherently valuable and is worth
seeking out. Plato is one example of a
philosopher who embodies this view, shown in
his Theory of Forms.
Plato
In Plato’s Theory of Forms, he argues
that this physical world is just a shadow or an
image of the ultimate true reality, which he calls
the Realm of the Forms (The Republic). For
example, he asserts that there is a true form of
Beauty (The Symposium), and all things that
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humans perceive as beautiful are perceived as
so because of the thread or image of the form
of Beauty that runs through these physical
shadows here. Humans can perceive these
shadows as beautiful because they have an
innate understanding of the Forms, but they do
not know it directly or intimately. In Plato’s
eyes, Truth exists in this Realm of the Forms,
and the Forms are the Truth that humans see
only shadows of in the physical world. So, all
interactions with these shadows are
engagements with Truth, but not attainments
of it.
Plato argues for an objective and
universal Truth because there is one Realm of
the Forms, which contains the Forms for all
things in this physical world, and the Forms are
not manipulated by human interpretations, but
exist prior to human cognition. Plato’s Theory of
Forms, concerning humans, can be understood
as a human’s continual struggle in
approximating the perfect Form we have in our
heads, but which we can neither fully reach nor
attain, at least in this physical world. However,
regardless of the impossibility of attaining this
perfection, or arriving at Truth through the
Forms, moving closer and striving for proximity
to Truth is extremely valuable and important.
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave demonstrates the
reason for this through powerful imagery.
In Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (The
Republic), Socrates describes prisoners who are
chained to the wall of a cave for their entire
lives. These prisoners see shadows on the wall
that they face, which are created from objects
moving in front of the fire behind them, which
they cannot see. The prisoners name these
shadows and perceive them as reality and they
are content with their life in the cave because
they do not know any differently. However, one
prisoner eventually breaks free from his chains
and when he does, he sees the fire and
recognizes that what he thought was reality was
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not reality at all, but it was a manufactured
reality: an illusion created by his senses and
perceptions. The reality he perceived was
actually a shadow of the true reality behind
him, being the fire, or the sun. Plato likens the
prisoner who breaks free to philosophers, who
see beyond the wall of the cave to see the
physical world for the illusion that it is and the
reality they encounter outside as the true
reality.
Plato continues to describe how the
prisoner is dragged from the cave into the sun;
once he adjusts, he will go back into the cave to
bring others out to see this awe‑striking reality.
However, those in the cave will see how
adjusting to the bright light of the sun has
affected him, in an apparently painful way, so
they will refuse to go outside the cave. Plato
implies the ignorance in this point of view on
behalf of the prisoners because they will miss
out on this greater reality that they merely do
not understand because they do not seek it out.
Through this, Plato argues for the inherent
value of Truth, and consequently, for the value
in seeking it out. Plato supports this by painting
a picture of what it will be like to finally reach
the true reality, namely Truth, by showing just
how ridiculous it would be to miss out on it due
to our denial of its value.
Nietzsche argues that the will to power
is the criterion of value (The Will to Power, p.
244), so truth therefore would have no value if
it does not assist in man’s pursuit of his will to
power. Plato argues otherwise, through the use
of imagery and logical appeals, in his telling of
the Allegory of the Cave. The audience
understands how valuable Truth, or true reality,
is because they understand that it would be a
shame for the prisoners to remain in their
chains out of ignorance and distrust of the value
of venturing outside; there would be an obvious
loss in doing so. The audience sees the value in
seeking out Truth, not because it will assist the
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prisoners in their will to power, but because it
will give them revelation and it brings them to
the Truth of reality. This reveals that Truth has
an inherent, essential value for humanity.
Nietzsche and Plato would both agree
that there is little drive for truth among
humans, or as Nietzsche sees it, no drive at all;
they are “content to receive stimuli and, as it
were, to engage in a groping game on the backs
of things” (On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral
Sense, p. 80). Plato, on the other hand, argues
that when humans do break free from the
chains and seek out Truth, it is invaluable
because it lends to revelation of the objective
and universal Truth of reality.
Lastly, Nietzsche claims that there is no
one true essence of something, which Plato
clearly would refute through his Theory of
Forms. Nietzsche also claims that meaning only
exists as a will to power, or as a persuasion for
others to accept this meaning, consequently
leading to power. However, both Plato and, as
we shall see, C.S. Lewis argue otherwise that
there is meaning beyond the will to power and
the true essence of a thing does exist, although
perhaps not in this physical world. In the
following section, I analyze two of C.S. Lewis’
works to assess his evaluation of and pursuit of
Truth through the lens of Platonic forms and as
a counter‑example to Nietzschean ideas of
truth.
C.S. Lewis and Analysis
C.S. Lewis expresses his ideas of Truth
throughout all his works, both in the form of
nonfiction orations and fiction novels. One
essay, originally delivered in oral form, is
entitled The Weight of Glory, and I use this work
to outline his understanding and evaluation of
Truth. I will also present material from Mere
Christianity to provide more evidence of his
belief in objective and universal Truth.
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During World War II, from 1942 to
1944, Lewis gave a series of radio broadcasts
centering on the topic of Christianity during a
time of serious adversity and war‑weariness.
Compilations of these broadcasts eventually
turned into his famous book, Mere Christianity,
which outlines how one can come to believe
first in universal morality and then in God
without having to let go of logical cognitive
processes.
In this book, Lewis affirms the existence
of objective and universal Truth by first
establishing the existence of universal moral
law. He writes, “My argument against God,”
when he was a young atheist, “was that the
universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how
had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man
does not call a line crooked unless he has some
idea of a straight line” (Mere Christianity).
Unlike Nietzsche, who argues that morality and
truth are products of human subjectivity, Lewis
argues that there is a universal and inherent
moral standard by which humans live. He
exemplifies this quite simply in saying that a
moral relativist “may break his promise to you,
but if you try to break on to him he will be
complaining, ‘It’s not fair,’ before you can say
Jack Robinson” (Mere Christianity).
Making this point gives him quite solid
ground to build his following claim that there is
an objective and universal Truth that is inherent
within us, although humans cannot understand
where exactly it comes from, and accordingly
has a significant value and purpose. He speaks
of Truth as something that we long for and do
not yet have, as a “far‑off country” that we
desire to reach. Informed by his Christian
beliefs, he views the encounter of Truth as an
encounter with God. In Lewis’ eyes, an
encounter with Truth is something that God has
created us to experience, yet we do not fully
experience it in this physical world, we only
experience small tastes of it. He alludes in his
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writings to his belief that we were created to
experience this in full, and that beyond the
limitations of this physical world we will be able
to do so.
Unlike Nietzsche, Lewis believes that
our drive to experience and to know Truth is so
powerful that we “betray ourselves like lovers
at the mention of a name,” and we cannot hide
this desire “because our experience is
constantly suggesting it” (Weight of Glory, 1949
p. 3). Like Plato’s idea of the Form of Beauty,
Lewis says that we are tempted to call this
Truth we so desire “Beauty” and to act as if that
does it justice, but we know it does not. If it
were, and if we were to go back to moments in
our past where we labeled this taste of Truth as
Beauty, we would find that beauty was not in
the thing we associated it with, but it only came
through it, “and what came through [it] was
longing” (p. 3). Lewis warns that while beauty is
a good image of what we really desire, we are
poorly mistaken if we take the thing itself,
through which we experienced Beauty, to be
the thing itself that we desire. He argues that,
“they turn [this thing] into [a] dumb idol,
breaking the hearts of [its] worshippers” (p. 3).
Like Plato, Lewis uses images when
unpacking big concepts in order to create a
more thorough and personal understanding of
these concepts for his audience. He does this in
his book Mere Christianity when explaining the
costly yet worthy pursuit of seeking Truth and
allowing one’s self to be transformed by God in
the process of doing so. He writes:
Imagine yourself as a living house. God
comes in to rebuild that house. At first,
perhaps, you can understand what he is
doing. He is getting the drains right and
stopping the leaks in the roof and so on; you
knew that those jobs needed doing and so
you are not surprised. But presently He
starts knocking the house about in a way
that hurts abominably and does not seem to
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make any sense. What on earth is He up to?
The explanation is that He is building quite a
different house from the one you thought of
– throwing out a new wing here, putting on
an extra floor there, running up towers,
making courtyards. You thought you were
being made into a decent little cottage: but
He is building a palace. He intends to come
and live in it Himself. (Mere Christianity)
Lewis demonstrates his value for the pursuit of
Truth, which he shares with Plato, but he goes
even further to argue that when one seeks out
Truth, they encounter the Creator of Truth,
namely God, and something transformational
happens in this encounter. Whereas Plato
understands Truth to be the Form of purest
reality, Lewis understands Truth to be the
essence of God. To his understanding, an
encounter with God – His essence and all – will
transform the person seeking His Truth.
Nietzsche argues that humans do not
care for truth all, but only care for the
consequences that come along with it (On Truth
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, p. 81). He
delivers this idea in such a way that clearly
communicates his disapproval of it. Lewis,
however, would respond with an analogy, in
typical fashion, about a boy learning Greek in
school to argue that a focus on the
consequences, especially initially, does not
deem a pursuit as invaluable. In this analogy, a
schoolboy is beginning Greek grammar and he
can’t possibly look forward to his future adult
enjoyment of great Greek poets when he is only
first starting off. He must first be motivated by
the grades he will receive, by his desire to
escape punishment, or even just to please his
parents. But as he continues to pursue his
studies of Greek grammar, at some
indistinguishable point, he “becomes able to
desire it for its own sake; indeed, the power of
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so desiring it is itself a preliminary reward”
(Weight of Glory, 1949 p. 2).
Lewis uses this analogy to impress upon
the reader his belief that since we are made for
heaven, which is the name he assigns to the
true ultimate reality that God created and in
which He dwells, we already have the desire for
this true and pure reality in us, but it is “not yet
attached to the true object itself” (p. 2).
Nonetheless, Lewis argues that we indeed have
a drive for Truth, whether we can initially
identify what we are aiming toward, or not.
There is inherent value in the Truth we seek and
in our pursuit of it because we have an innate
desire or drive for it, which counter one of
Nietzsche’s primary assumptions.
Like Plato’s World of Forms, Lewis
ascribes these tastes or encounters of Truth,
like the shadows on the wall, as reflections or
images of the true reality. He argues that, “they
are not the thing itself; they are only the scent
of a flower we have not found, the echo of a
tune we have not heard, news from a country
we have never yet visited” (p. 3). As Lewis
writes, “Our lifelong nostalgia, our longing to be
reunited with something in the universe from
which we now feel cut off, to be on the inside of
some door which we have always seen from the
outside, is no mere neurotic fancy, but the
truest index of our real situation” (p. 8).
Where Lewis differs from both Plato
and Nietzsche is in his belief of our union with
the Creator of Truth, which will cause us to
eventually embody this true reality that we
seek. As he puts it:
We want something else which can hardly
be put into words – to be united with the
beauty we see, to pass into it, to receive it
into ourselves, to bathe in it, to become part
of it… We discern the freshness and purity
of morning, but they do not make us fresh
and pure. We cannot mingle with the
splendors we see. (p. 8)
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This is the obstacle that keeps us here, in our
chains in Plato’s Cave. Lewis assures his
audience with conviction: “We are summoned
to pass in through Nature, beyond her, into that
splendor which she fitfully reflects” (p. 8). Lewis
claims that we humans will one day not only
mingle with the Truth that taunts us, which we
presently only know tastes of, but we will also
pass into it and embody it. This affirms the
inherent value of Truth and justifies the value in
our pursuit of Truth.
Conclusion
Whether one is religious or not, Lewis
offers significant insights to the discussion on
the inherent value of truth and of its pursuit.
Furthermore, he offers invaluable contributions
to the field of rhetorical theory.
First, Lewis reminds rhetoricians that a
core responsibility of a rhetorician is to remind
the audience of the transcendental end toward
which humanity is directed. Rhetoric serves as
vehicle for both hope and remembrance of
overarching shared values. It conjures shared
experiences in the mind of the audience,
regardless if the values being argued for are
agreed upon or not, and this increases the
resonance of the message.
Second, rhetoric should be aimed at
communicating a bigger picture of truth rather
than solely seeking to arrive at a desired
outcome. Rhetoricians have a responsibility to
lead their audience towards the end goal, giving
them the tools along the way that they need to
understand where they are going. Philosophers
like Quintilian support this understanding of
rhetoric as a way to serve the people and
spread good and honest messages for their
benefit rather than as a way to push a personal
or manipulative agenda (The Institutio
Oratoria). Rhetoricians must work
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to protect their audience from manipulation
and to promote their personal adoption of the
message through free will. Lewis defends this
view of rhetoric when he explains where he is
going all the while moving towards an end goal.
Third, although many philosophers use
the highly metaphorical and symbolic nature of
our language as a reason to deem things spoken
of as meaningless, Lewis exemplifies the power
in speaking symbolically. He does not fear
speaking symbolically because he understands
that it is very effective to explain abstract
concepts by engaging the audience’s
imaginations. Lewis sees reason as the organ of
Truth and imagination as the organ of meaning.
This calls rhetoricians to not only deliver
content, but to do so in a way that will be
meaningful and memorable to the
Audience.
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Finally, rhetoricians must keep in mind
that audiences do not just want to know;
audiences, made up of individual humans, want
to engage, to interact with, and to be
acknowledged as well as to acknowledge.
Delivering a message to an audience will have
no impact if it is not done so in a way that
engages the audience and calls to attention
their humanity and their will to choose
and to act.
As a concluding thought, I believe that
C.S. Lewis would respond to Nietzsche in the
following way: “You can’t go on ‘seeing through’
things forever. The whole point of seeing
through something is to see something through
it. To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not
to see” (The Abolition of Man, 2001).
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